An All-Or-Nothing Flavor to the Church-Turing Hypothesis by Wolf, Stefan
ar
X
iv
:1
70
2.
00
92
3v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
3 F
eb
 20
17
An All-Or-Nothing Flavor to
the Church-Turing Hypothesis
Stefan Wolf
Faculty of Informatics, Universita` della Svizzera italiana (USI), CH-6900 Lugano.
Facolta` indipendente di Gandria, Lunga scala, CH-6978 Gandria.
Abstract. Landauer’s principle claims that “Information is Physical.”
It is not surprising that its conceptual antithesis, Wheeler’s “It from
Bit,” has been more popular among computer scientists — in the form
of the Church-Turing hypothesis: All natural processes can be computed
by a universal Turing machine; physical laws then become descriptions
of subsets of observable, as opposed to merely possible, computations.
Switching back and forth between the two traditional styles of thought,
motivated by quantum-physical Bell correlations and the doubts they
raise about fundamental space-time causality, we look for an intrinsic,
physical randomness notion and find one around the second law of ther-
modynamics. Bell correlations combined with complexity as randomness
tell us that beyond-Turing computations are either physically impossible,
or they can be carried out by “devices” as simple as individual photons.
1 Introduction
1.1 Ice versus Fire
According to Jeanne Hersch [23], the entire history of philosophy is coined by
an antagonism rooting in the fundamentally opposite world views of the pre-
Socratic philosophers Parmenides of Elea (515 B.C.E. – 445 B.C.E.) on the one
hand and Heraclitus (520 B.C.E. – 460 B.C.E.) on the other. For Parmenides,
any change, even time itself, is simply an illusion, whilst for Heraclitus, change
is all there is. The “cold logician” Parmenides has been compared to ice, and
Heraclitus’ thinking is the fiery one [29]. If Hersch is right, and this opposition
between these styles crosses the history of philosophy like a red line, then this
must be true no less for the history of science.
A textbook example illustrating the described antagonism is the debate be-
tween Newton and Leibniz [39]: For Newton, space and time are fundamental
and given a priori, just like a stage on which all the play is located. For Leibniz,
on the other hand, space and time are emergent as relational properties: The
stage emerges with the play and not prior to it, and it is not there without it.
With only a few exceptions — most notably Ernst Mach — the course of phys-
ical science went for Newton’s view; it did so with good success. An important
example here is, of course, Einstein’s relativity: Whilst its crystallization point
was Mach’s principle, stating that intertial forces are relational (as opposed to
2coming from acceleration against an absolute space), the resulting theory does
not follow the principle since there is (the flat) space-time also in a massless
universe.
In the present work, we turn our attention to physical phenomena such as the
second law of thermodynamics and Bell correlations from quantum theory. We
find here again the opposition between Parmenides’ and Heraclitus’ standpoints,
and we directly build on their tension with the goal of obtaining more insight,
hereby bridging the gap separating them to some extent.
The Heraclitean style can be recognized again in the spirit of Ferdinand
Gonseth’s “La logique est tout d’abord une science naturelle” — “Logic is, first
of all, a natural science.” This is a predecessor of Rolf Landauer’s famous slogan
“Information Is Physical,” [27] putting physics at the basis of the concept of
information and its treatment.
This is in sharp contrast to Shannon’s [34] (very successful) making infor-
mation abstract, independent of the particular physical realization of it (e.g.,
a specific noisy communication channel). To the Parmenidean paradigm be-
longs also the Church-Turing hypothesis [25], stating that all physically possible
processes can be simulated by a universal Turing machine. This basing physical
reality on information and computation was later summarized by John Archibald
Wheeler as “It from Bit” [40].
1.2 Non-Locality, Space-Time Causality, and Randomness
After Einstein had made the world mechanistic and “local” (without actions at
a distance), he was himself involved in a work [17] paving the (long) way to that
locality to fall again. The goal of Einstein et al. had, however, been the exact
opposite: to save locality in view of correlations displayed in the measurement
behavior of (potentially physically separated) parts of an entangled quantum
state. The claim was that quantum theory was an only incomplete description
of nature, to be refined by hidden parameters determining the outcomes of all
potential, alternative measurements. It took roughly thirty years until that claim
was grounded when John Stewart Bell [7] showed the impossibility of the pro-
gram — ironically making the case with the exact same states as “EPR” had
introduced. The consequences of Bell’s insight are radical: If the values are not
predetermined, then there must be fresh and at the same time identical pieces
of classical information popping us spontaneously — this is non-locality. The
conceptual problem these correlations lead us into is the difficulty of explaining
their origin causally, i.e., according to Reichenbach’s principle — which states
that a correlation between two space-time events can stem from a common cause
(in the common past) or a direct influence from one event to the other [33]. Bell’s
result rules out the common cause as an explanation, thus remains the influence.
Besides the fact that it is an inelegant overkill to explain a non-signaling phe-
nomenon (not allowing for transmitting messages from one party to the other)
using a signaling mechanism, there are further problems: Hidden influences as
explanations of Bell correlation require both infinite speed [36], [16], [1] and
precision [42].
3In view of this, it appears reasonable to question the (only) assumption made
in Reichenbach’s principle: The a priori causal structure [30].1 If we turn back
the wheel to the Newton-Leibniz debate, and choose to follow Leibniz instead,
seeing space-time as appearing only a posteriori, then there is a first victim to
this: Randomness : In [15], a piece of information is called freely random if it is
statistically independent from all other pieces of information except the ones in
its future light cone. Clearly, when the assumption of an initially given causal
structure is dropped, such a definition is not founded any longer.2 (It is then
possible to turn around the affair and base past and future on postulated freeness
of bits [6].) In any case, we are now motivated to find an intrinsic, context-free,
physical definition of randomness and choose to look at: Watt’s Steam Engine.
2 The Search for an Intrinsic Randomness Notion: From
Steam Pipes to the Second Law of Thermodynamics
2.1 The Fragility and the Robustness of the Second Law
The second law of thermodynamics has advanced to becoming pop culture.3 It is,
however, much less famous than Einstein’s relativity, Heisenberg’s uncertainty,
or quantum teleportation because it does not have any glamour, fascination, or
hope attached to it: The law stands for facts many of us are in denial of or try to
escape. We ask whether the attribution of that formalized pessimism to physics
has historical reasons.
The validity of the second law seems to depend on surprising conditions
such as the inexistence of certain life styles (e.g., Maxwell’s demon or photo-
synthesizing plants — Kelvin [24] writes: “When light is absorbed other than in
vegetation, there is dissipation [...]”). To make things worse, there is always a
non-zero probability (exponentially small, though) of exceptions where the law
fails to hold; we are not used to this from other laws of physics. Can this be
taken as an indication that the fundamental way of formulating the law eludes
us?
The described fragility of the second law is strangely contrasted by its being,
in another way, more robust than others (such as Bell violations only realizable
under extremely precise lab conditions): We certainly do not need to trust ex-
perimentalists to be convinced that the second law is acting, everywhere and
always. It has even been claimed [38] to hold a “supreme position” among physi-
cal laws: It appears easier to imagine a world where relativity or quantum theory
1 It has been shown [5] that if causality is dropped but logical consistency maintained,
then a rich world opens — comparable to the one between locality and signaling.
2 Note furthermore that the definition is consistent with full determinism: A random
variable with trivial distribution is independent of every other (even itself).
3 See, e.g., Allen, W., Husbands and Wives (1992): The protagonist Sally is explaining
why her marriage did not work out. First she does not know, then she realizes: “It’s
the second law of thermodynamics: sooner or later everything turns to shit. That’s
my phrasing, not the Encyclopedia Britannica.”
4do not hold than to figure out a reality lacking the validity of the second law.
(Concerning the reasons for this, we can only speculate: Would we be forced to
give up the mere possibility of perception, memory — the arrow of time?)
2.2 History
This story (see [38]) starts with Sadi Carnot (1796–1832) and his study of heat
engines such as James Watt ’s steam pipe. The assumption, in consequence, that
the law is closely related to such engines, and to the circular processes involved, is
of course not wrong, but it underestimates a fundamental logical-combinatorial-
informational fact ; perhaps steam engines are to the second law what telescopes
are for Jupiter’s moons.
Carnot argued that the maximal efficiency of a heat engine between two heat
baths depended only on the two temperatures involved. (The derived formula
motivated Lord Kelvin to define the absolute temperature scale.)
Rudolf Clausius’ (1822–1888) [14] version of the second law reads: “Es kann
nie Wa¨rme aus einem ka¨lteren in einen wa¨rmeren Ko¨rper u¨bergehen, ohne dass
eine andere damit zusammenha¨ngende A¨nderung eintritt.” — “No process can
transport heat from cold to hot and do no further change.”
Lord Kelvin (1824–1907) [24] formulated his own version of the second law
and concluded — in just the next sentence— that the law may have consequences
deeper than what was obvious at first sight: “Restoration of mechanical energy
without dissipation [...] is impossible. Within a finite period of time past, the
earth must have been, within a finite time, the earth must again be unfit for the
habitation of man.”
Also for Clausius, it was only a single thinking step from his version of the
law to concluding that all temperature differences in the entire universe will
vanish (the Wa¨rmetod) and that then, no change will be possible anymore.
He speaks of a general tendency of nature for change into a specific direction:
“Wendet man dieses auf das Weltall im Ganzen an, so gelangt man zu einer
eigentu¨mlichen Schlussfolgerung, auf welche zuerst W. Thomson [Lord Kelvin]
aufmerksam machte, nachdem er sich meiner Auffassung des zweiten Haupt-
satzes angeschlossen hatte. Wenn [...] im Weltall die Wa¨rme stets das Bestreben
zeigt, [...] dass [...] Temperaturdifferenzen ausgeglichen werden, so muss es sich
mehr und mehr dem Zustand anna¨hern, wo [...] keine Temperaturdifferenzen
mehr existieren.” — in short: “He was right after he had realized that I had
been right: At the end, no temperature differences will be left in the universe.”
Ludwig Boltzmann (1844–1906) brought our understanding of the second law
closer to combinatorics and probability theory (in particular, the law of large
numbers). His version is based on the fact that it is more likely to end up in a
large set (of possible states) than in a small one: The more “microstates” belong
to a given “macrostate,” the more likely is it that you will find yourself in that
macrostate. In other words, if you observe the time evolution of a system (by
some reason starting in a very small, “unlikely” macrostate), then the “entropy”
5of the system — here simply (the logarithm of) the number of corresponding
microstates — does not decrease.4
The notion of macrostate and its entropy have been much debated. Von
Neumann remarked [38]: “No one knows what entropy really is, so in a debate
you will always have the advantage.” We aim at a version of the second law
avoiding this advantage: a view without probabilities or ensembles, but based
on intrinsic, one-shot complexity instead. Crucial steps in that direction were
made by Zurek [43]. We take a Church-Turing view and follow Landauer [27]
whose role or, more specifically, whose choice of viewpoint around the second
law can be compared with Ernst Specker ’s [35] take on quantum theory: logical.
2.3 Reversibility
Landauer investigated the thermodynamic price of logical operations. He was
correcting a belief by John von Neumann that every bit operation required free
energy kT ln 2 (where k is Boltzmann’s constant, T the environmental temper-
ature, and ln 2 owed to the fact that 2 is not a natural but a logical constant).
According to Landauer — and affirmed by Fredkin and Toffoli’s “ballistic com-
puter” [21] —, this limitation or condition only concerns (bit) operations which
are logically irreversible, such as the AND or the OR. On the positive side, it has
been observed that every function, bijective or not, can in principle be evaluated
in a logically reversible way, using only “Toffoli gates,” i.e., made-reversible and
then-universal AND gates ; its computation can be thermodynamically neutral:
It does not have to dissipate heat.
Landauer’s principle states erasing (setting the corresponding memory cells
to 0) N bits costs kTN ln 2 free energy which must be dissipated as heat to
the environment (of temperature T ). This dissipation is crucial in the argument:
Heating up the environment compensates for the entropy loss within the memory
cell, realized as a physical system (spin, gas molecule, etc.).
Let us consider the inverse process: Work extraction. Bennett [8] made the
key contribution to the resolution of the paradox of Maxwell’s demon. That
demon had been thought of as violating the second law by adaptively handling a
frictionless door with the goal of “sorting a gas” in a container. Bennett took the
demon’s memory (imagined to be in the all-0-state before sorting) into account,
which is in the end filled with “random” information, an expression of the original
state of the gas. The growth of disorder inside the demon compensates for the
4 Boltzmann imagined further that the universe had started in a completely “uniform”
state, so the entire, rich reality perceived would be a simple fluctuation. (Note that
the fact that this fluctuation is extremely unlikely is irrelevant if we can condition
on our existence, given our discussing this.) He may have been aware that this way
of thinking leads straight into solipsism: “My existence alone, simply imagining my
environment, seems much more likely than the actual existence of all people around
me, let alone all the visible galaxies, etc.” — he killed himself in a hotel room in
Duino, Italy; it has been told that this was also related to “mobbing” by Mach in
Vienna. In any case, we choose to comfort us today with the somewhat religious
assumption that the universe initiated in a low-entropy state, called the big bang.
6order she creates outside (i.e., in the gas) — the second law is saved. The initial
0-string is the demon’s resource allowing for her order creation.
If we break Bennett’s argument apart in the middle, we end up with the con-
verse of Landauer’s principle: The all-0-string has work value, i.e., if we accept
the price of the respective memory cells to become “randomized” in the process,
we can extract kTN ln 2 free energy from the environment (a heat bath of tem-
perature T ). In a constructivist manner, we choose to view the work-extraction
process as an algorithm which, according to the Church-Turing hypothesis, we
imagine as being carried out by a universal Turing machine. It then follows that
the work value of a string S is closely related to the possibility of lossless com-
pression of that string: For any concrete data-compression algorithm, we can
extract kT ln 2 times the length of S (uncompressed) minus the length of its
compression: Work value is redundancy (in representation) of information. On
the other end of the scale, the upper bound on work extraction is linked to the
ultimate compression limit: Kolmogorov complexity, i.e., the length of the short-
est program for the extraction demon (Turing machine) generating the string in
question. This holds because a computation is logically reversible only if it can
be carried out in the other direction, step by step.
There is a direct connection between the work value and the erasure cost
(in the sense of Landauer’s principle) of a string. We assume here that for both
processes, the extraction demon has access to an additional string X (modeling
prior “knowledge” about S) which serves as a catalyst and is to be unchanged at
at the end of the process. For a string S ∈ {0, 1}N , let WV(S|X) and EC(S|X)
be its work value and erasure costs, respectively, given X . Then5
WV(S|X) + EC(S|X) = N .
To see this, consider first the combination extract-then-erase. Since this is
one specific way of erasing, we have
EC(S|X) ≤ N −WV(S|X) .
If, on the other hand, we consider the combination erase-then-extract, this leads
to
WV(S|X) ≥ N − EC(S|X) .
Given the results on the work value discussed above, as well as this connec-
tion between the work value and erasure cost, we obtain the following bounds on
the thermodynamic cost of erasing a string S by a demon, modeled as a universal
Turing machine U with initial tape content X .
Landauer’s principle, revisited. Let C be a computable compression function
C : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}∗
such that (A,B) 7→ (C(A,B), B) is injective. Then we have
KU(S|X) ≤ EC(S|X) ≤ len(C(S,X)) .
5 Let kT ln 2 = 1.
7Landauer’s revised principle puts forward two ideas: First, the erasure cost is
an intrinsic, context-free, physical measure for randomness (entirely independent
of probabilities and counter-factual statements of the form “some value could
just as well have been different,” i.e., removing one layer of speculation). The
idea that the erasure cost — or the Kolmogorov complexity related to it — is a
measure for randomness independent of probabilities can be tested in a context
in which randomness has been paramount: Bell correlations [7] predicted by
quantum theory, see Section for details 3.
The second idea starts from the observation that the price for the logical irre-
versibility of the erasure transformation comes in the form of a thermodynamic
effort.6 In an attempt to harmonize this somewhat hybrid picture, we invoke
Wheeler’s [40] “It from Bit : Every it — every particle, every field of force, even
the space-time continuum itself — derives its function, its meaning, its very ex-
istence entirely [...] from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions,
binary choices, bits.” This is an anti-thesis to Landauer’s slogan, and we propose
the following synthesis of the two: If Wheeler suggests to look at the environment
as being information as well, then Landauer’s principle ends up to be read as:
The necessary environmental compensation for the logical irreversibility of the
erasure of S is such that the overall computation, including the environment, is
logically reversible: no information ever gets completely lost.
Second law, Church-Turing view. If reality is assumed to be computed by a
Turing machine, then that computation has the property of being injective: Na-
ture computes with Toffoli, but no AND or OR gates.
This fact is a priori asymmetric in time: The future must uniquely determine
the past, not necessarily vice versa. (This is identical with Grete Herrmann’s [22]
take on causality.) In case the condition holds also for the reverse time direction,
the computation is deterministic, and randomized otherwise.
2.4 Consequences
If logical reversibility is a simple computational version of a discretized second
law, does it have implications resembling the traditional versions of the law?
Logical reversibility implies quasi-monotonicity.
First of all, we find a “Boltzmann-like” form, i.e., the existence of a quantity
essentially monotonic in time. More specifically, the logical reversibility of time
evolution implies that the Kolmogorov complexity of the global state at time t
6 Since the amount of the required free energy (and heat dissipation) is proportional
to the length of the best compression of the string, the latter can be seen as a
quantification of the erasure transformation’s irreversibility.
8can be smaller than the one at time 0 only by at most K(Ct) + O(1) if Ct is a
string encoding the time span t. The reason is that one possibility of describing
the state at time 0 is to give the state at time t, plus t itself; the rest is exhaustive
search using only a constant-length program simulating forward time evolution
(including possible randomness).
Logical reversibility implies Clausius-like law.
Similarly, logical reversibility also implies statements resembling the version of
the second law due to Clausius : “Heat does not spontaneously flow from cold
to hot.” The rationale here is that if we have a computation — the time evolu-
tion — using only (logically reversible) Toffoli gates, then it is impossible that
this circuit computes a transformation mapping a pair of strings to another
pair such that the Hamming-heavier of the two becomes even heavier whilst the
lighter gets lighter. A function accentuating imbalance, instead of lessening it, is
not reversible, as a basic counting argument shows.
Example. Let a circuit consisting of only Toffoli gates map an N(= 2n)-bit string
to another. We consider the map separately on the first and second halves and
assume the computed function to be conservative, i.e., to leave the Hamming
weight of the full string unchanged at n (conservativity can be seen as some
kind of first law, i.e., the preservation of a quantity). We look at the excess
of 1’s in one of the halves (which equals the deficit of 1’s in the other). We
observe that the probability (with respect to the uniform distribution over all
strings of some Hamming-weight couple [wn, (1−w)n]) of the imbalance substan-
tially growing is exponentially weak. The key ingredient for the argument is the
function’s injectivity. Explicitly, the probability that the weight couple changes
from [wn, (1 − w)n] to [(w + ∆)n, (1 − w − ∆)n] — or more extremely —, for
1/2 ≤ w < 1 and 0 < ∆ ≤ 1− w, is
(
n
(w+∆)n
)(
n
(1−w−∆)n
)
(
n
wn
)(
n
(1−w)n
) = 2−Θ(n) .
Note here that we even get the correct, exponentially weak “error probability”
with which the traditional second law can be “violated.”
Logical reversibility implies Kelvin-like law.
“A single heat bath alone has no work value.” This, again, follows from a sim-
ple counting argument. There exists no reversible circuit that, for general input
environments (with a fixed weight — intuitively: heat energy), extracts redun-
dancy, i.e., work value, and concentrates it in some pre-chosen bit positions:
Concentrated redundancy is more of it.
9Example. The probability that a fixed circuit maps a “Hamming bath” of lengthN
and Hamming weight w to another such that the first n positions contain all 1’s
and such that the Hamming weight of the remaining N − n positions is w − n
(again, we are assuming conservation here) is
(
N−n
w−n
)
(
N
w
) = 2−Θ(n) .
2.5 Discussion and Questions
We propose a logical view of the second law of thermodynamics: the injectivity
or logical reversibility of time evolution. This is somewhat ironic as the second
law has often been related to its exact opposite: irreversibility.7 It implies, within
the Church-Turing view, Clausius-, Kelvin-, and Boltzmann-like statements. We
arrive at seeing a law combinatorial in nature — and its discovery in the context
of steam pipes as a historical incident.
A logically reversible computation can still split up paths [18].8 This “ran-
domness” may bring in objective time asymmetry. What is then the exact mech-
anism by which randomness implies that a record tells more about the past than
about the future? (Does it?)
3 Bell Correlations and the Church-Turing Hypothesis
We test the obtained intrinsic notion of randomness, in the form of erasure cost
or Kolmogorov complexity, with a physical phenomenon that we have already
mentioned above as challenging a-priori causality: “non-local” correlations from
quantum theory. In fact, randomness has been considered crucial in the argu-
ment. We put this belief into question in its exclusiveness; at the same time we
avoid in our reasoning connecting results of different measurements that, in fact,
exclude each other (in other words, we refrain from assuming so-called counter-
factual definiteness, i.e., that all these measurement outcomes even exist alto-
7 Since new randomness cannot be gotten rid of later, the equation reads: “Logical
reversibility plus randomness equals thermodynamic irreversibility.” If you can go
back logically in a random universe, then you certainly cannot thermodynamically.
8 Note that there is no (objective) splitting up, or randomness, if time evolutions
are unitary, e.g., come from Schro¨dinger, heat-propagation, or Maxwell’s equations.
What is then the origin of the arrow of time? The quantum-physical version of
injectivity is Hugh Everett III’s relative-state interpretation. How do we imagine the
bridge from global unitarity to the subjective perception of time asymmetry? When
we looked above, with Landauer, at a closed classical system of two parts, then
the (possible) complexity deficit in one of them must simply be compensated in a
corresponding increase in the other. In Everett’s view, this means that there can
be low-entropy branches of the wave function (intuitively, yet too na¨ıvely, called:
parallel universes) as long as they are compensated by other, highly complex ones.
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gether).9 For the sake of comparison, we first review the common, probabilistic,
counter-factual reasoning.
3.1 Bell Non-Local Correlations
Non-locality, manifested in violations of Bell inequalities, expresses the impossi-
bility to prepare parts of an entangled system simultaneously for all possible mea-
surements. We look at an idealized non-local correlation, the Popescu-Rohrlich
(PR) box [31]. Let A and B be the respective input bits to the box and X and Y
the output bits; the (classical) bits satisfy
X ⊕ Y = A ·B . (1)
According to a result by Fine [20], the non-locality of the system (i.e., condi-
tional distribution) PXY |AB, which means that it cannot be written as a convex
combination of products PX|A · PY |B, is equivalent to the fact that there exists
no preparation for all alternative measurement outcomes P ′X0X1Y0Y1 such that
P ′XiYj = PXY |A=i,B=j
for all (i, j) ∈ {0, 1}2. In this view, non-locality means that the outputs cannot
exist10 before the inputs do. Let us make this qualitative statement more precise.
We assume a perfect PR box, i.e., a system always satisfying X ⊕ Y = A · B.
Note that this equation alone does not uniquely determine PXY |AB since the
marginal of X , for instance, is not determined. If, however, we additionally
require no-signaling, then the marginals, such as PX|A=0 or PY |B=0, must be
perfectly unbiased under the assumption that all four (X,Y )-combinations, i.e.,
(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1), are possible. To see this, assume on the contrary
that PX|A=0,B=0(0) > 1/2. By the PR condition (1), we can conclude the same
for Y : PY |A=0,B=0(0) > 1/2. By no-signaling, we also have PX|A=0,B=1(0) >
1/2. Using symmetry, and no-signaling again, we obtain both PX|A=1,B=1(0) >
1/2 and PY |A=1,B=1(0) > 1/2. This contradicts the PR condition (1) since two
9 The counter-factual nature of the reasoning claiming “non-classicality” of quan-
tum theory, that was the main motivation in [41], has already been pointed out by
Specker [35]: “In einem gewissen Sinne geho¨ren aber auch die scholastischen Speku-
lationen u¨ber die Infuturabilien hieher, das heisst die Frage, ob sich die go¨ttliche All-
wissenheit auch auf Ereignisse erstrecke, die eingetreten wa¨ren, falls etwas geschehen
wa¨re, was nicht geschehen ist.” — “In some sense, this is also related to the scholas-
tic speculations on the infuturabili, i.e., the question whether divine omniscience
even extends to what would have happened if something had happened that did not
happen.”
10 What does it mean that a classical bit exists? Note first that classicality of informa-
tion implies that it can be measured without disturbance and that the outcome of
a “measurement” is always the same; this makes it clear that it is an idealized no-
tion requiring the classical bit to be represented in a redundant way over an infinite
number of degrees of freedom, as a thermodynamic limit. It makes thus sense to say
that a classical bit U exists, i.e., has taken a definite value.
11
bits which are both biased towards 0 cannot differ with certainty. Therefore,
our original assumption was wrong: The outputs must be perfectly unbiased.
Altogether, this means that X as well as Y cannot exist (i.e., take a definite
value — actually, there cannot even exist a classical value arbitrarily weakly
correlated with one of them) before the classical bit f(A,B) exists for some
nontrivial deterministic function f : {0, 1}2 → {0, 1}. The paradoxical aspect of
non-locality — at least if a causal structure is in place — now consists of the
fact that fresh pieces of information come to existence in a spacelike-separated
manner that are nonetheless perfectly correlated.
3.2 Kolmogorov Complexity
We introduce the basic notions required for our alternative, complexity-based
view. Let U be a fixed universal Turing machine (TM).11 For a finite or infinite
string s, the Kolmogorov complexity [26], [28] K(s) = KU (s) is the length of the
shortest program for U such that the machine outputs s. Note that K(s) can be
infinite if s is.
Let a = (a1, a2, . . .) be an infinite string. Then
a[n] := (a1, . . . , an, 0, . . .) .
We study the asymptotic behavior of K(a[n]) : N → N. For this function, we
simply write K(a), similarly K(a | b) for K(a[n] | b[n]), the latter being the length
of the shortest program outputting a[n] upon input b[n]. We write
K(a) ≈ n :⇐⇒ lim
n→∞
K(a[n])
n
= 1 .
We call a string a with this property incompressible. We also useK(a[n]) = Θ(n),
as well as
K(a) ≈ 0 :⇐⇒ lim
n→∞
K(a[n])
n
= 0⇐⇒ K(a[n]) = o(n) .
Note that computable strings a satisfy K(a) ≈ 0, and that incompressibility is,
in this sense, the extreme case of uncomputability.
Generally, for functions f(n) and g(n) 6≈ 0, we write f ≈ g if f/g → 1.
Independence of a and b is then12
K(a | b) ≈ K(a)
or, equivalently,
K(a, b) ≈ K(a) +K(b) .
11 The introduced asymptotic notions are independent of this choice.
12 This is inspired by [12] (see also [13]), where (joint) Kolmogorov complexity — or, in
practice, any efficient compression method — is used to define a distance measure on
sets of bit strings (such as literary texts of genetic information of living beings). The
resulting structure in that case is a distance measure, and ultimately a clustering as
a binary tree.
12
If we introduce
IK(x; y) := K(x)−K(x | y) ≈ K(y)−K(y |x) ,
independence of a and b is IK(a, b) ≈ 0.
In the same spirit, we can define conditional independence: We say that a
and b are independent given c if
K(a, b | c) ≈ K(a | c) +K(b | c)
or, equivalently,
K(a | b, c) ≈ K(a | c) ,
or
IK(a; b | c) := K(a | c)−K(a | b, c) ≈ 0 .
3.3 Correlations and Computability
We are now ready to discuss non-local correlations with our context-free ran-
domness measure. The mechanism we discover is very similar to what holds
probabilistically: If the choices of the measurements are random (uncomputable)
and non-signaling holds, then the outputs must be random (uncomputable) as
well. We prove the following statement.
Uncomputability from Correlations. There exist bipartite quantum states
with a behavior under measurements such that if the sequences of setting encod-
ings are maximally uncomputable (incompressible), then the sequences of mea-
surement results are uncomputable as well, even given the respective setting se-
quences.
Proof.We proceed step by step, starting with the idealized system of the PR box.
Let first (a, b, x, y) be infinite binary strings with
xi ⊕ yi = ai · bi . (2)
Obviously, the intuition is that the strings stand for the inputs and outputs of
a PR box. Yet, no dynamic meaning is attached to the strings anymore (or to
the “box,” for that matter) since there is no “free choice” of an input and no
generation of an output in function of the input; all we have is a quadruple
of strings satisfying the PR condition (2). However, nothing prevents us from
defining this (static) situation to be no-signaling:
K(x | a) ≈ K(x | ab) and K(y | b) ≈ K(y | ab) . (3)
We argue that if the inputs are incompressible and independent, and no-
signaling holds, then the outputs must be uncomputable: To see this, assume
now that (a, b, x, y) ∈ ({0, 1}N)4 with x⊕ y = a · b (bit-wisely), no-signaling (3),
and
K(a, b) ≈ 2n ,
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i.e., the “input” pair is incompressible. We conclude
K(a · b | b) ≈ n/2 .
Note first that bi = 0 implies ai ·bi = 0, and second that any further compression
of a ·b, given b, would lead to “structure in (a, b),” i.e., a possibility of describing
(programming) a given b in shorter than n and, hence, (a, b) in shorter than 2n.
Observe now
K(x | b) +K(y | b) ≥ K(a · b | b)
which implies
K(y | b) ≥ K(a · b | b)−K(x | b) ≥ n/2−K(x) . (4)
On the other hand,
K(y | a, b) ≈ K(x | a, b) ≤ K(x) . (5)
Now, no-signaling (3) together with (4) and (5) implies
n/2−K(x) ≤ K(x) ,
and
K(x) ≥ n/4 = Θ(n) :
(This bound can be improved by a more involved argument [4].) The string x
must be uncomputable.
A priori, it is not overly surprising to receive uncomputable outputs upon
inputs having the same property. Thus, we now turn our attention to the condi-
tional output complexities given the inputs: We consider the quantities K(x | a)
and K(y | b). Note first
K(x | a) ≈ 0⇔ K(x | ab) ≈ K(y | ab) ≈ 0⇔ K(y | b) ≈ 0 ,
i.e., the two expressions vanish simultaneously. We show that, in fact, they both
fail to be of order o(n). To see this, assume K(x | a) ≈ 0 and K(y | b) ≈ 0. Hence,
there exist programs Pn and Qn (both of length o(n)) for functions fn and gn
with
fn(an)⊕ gn(bn) = an · bn . (6)
For fixed (families of) functions fn and gn, asymptotically how many (an, bn) can
at most exist that satisfy (6)? The question boils down to a parallel-repetition
analysis of the PR game: A result by Raz [32] implies that the number is of
order (2 − Θ(1))2n. Therefore, the two programs Pn and Qn together with the
index, of length
(1 −Θ(1))2n ,
of the correct pair (a, b) within the list of length (2−Θ(1))2n lead to a program,
generating (a, b), that has length
o(n) + (1 −Θ(1))2n ,
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in contradiction to the assumption of incompressibility of (a, b).
Unfortunately, perfect PR boxes are not predicted by quantum theory. We
show that correlations which are achievable in the laboratory [37] allow for the
argument to go through; they are based on the chained Bell inequality [3] instead
of perfect PR-type non-locality.
To the chained Bell inequality belongs the following idealized system: Let
A,B ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be the inputs. We assume the “promise” that B is congruent
to A or to A+1 modulo m. Given this promise, the outputs X,Y ∈ {0, 1} must
satisfy
X ⊕ Y = χA=m,B=1 , (7)
where χA=m,B=1 is the characteristic function of the event {A = m,B = 1}.
Barrett, Hardy, and Kent [3] showed that if A and B are random, then X
and Y must be perfectly unbiased if the system is no-signaling. More precisely,
they were even able to show such a statement from the gap between the error
probabilities of the best classical — Θ(1/m) — and quantum — Θ(1/m2) —
strategies for winning this game.
We assume (a, b, x, y) ∈ ({1, . . . ,m}n)2 × ({0, 1}n)2 to be such that the
promise holds, and such that
K(a, b) ≈ (logm+ 1) · n , (8)
i.e., the string a||b is maximally incompressible given the promise; the system
is no-signaling (3); the fraction of quadruples (ai, bi, xi, yi), i = 1, . . . , n, satisfy-
ing (7) is of order (1 −Θ(1/m2))n. Then K(x) = Θ(n).
To see this, observe first that K(a, b) being maximal implies
K(χa=m,b=1 | b) ≈
n
m
: (9)
The fractions of 1’s in b must, asymptotically, be 1/m due to the string’s in-
compressibility. If we condition on these positions, the string χa=m,b=1 is incom-
pressible, since otherwise there would be the possibility of compressing (a, b).
Now, we have
K(x | b) +K(y | b) + h(Θ(1/m2))n ≥ K(χa=m,b=1 | b)
since one possibility for “generating” the string χa=m,b=1, from position 1 to n,
is to generate x[n] and y[n] as well as the string indicating the positions where (7)
is violated, the complexity of the latter being at most13
log
(
n
Θ(1/m2)n
)
≈ h(Θ(1/m2))n .
Let us compare this with 1/m: Although the binary entropy function has
slope ∞ in 0, we have
h(Θ(1/m2)) < 1/(3m)
13 Here, h is the binary entropy h(x) = −p log
2
p − (1 − p) log
2
(1 − p). Usually, p
is a probability, but h is invoked here merely as an approximation for binomial
coefficients.
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if m is sufficiently large. To see this, observe first that the dominant term of h(x)
for small x is −x log x, and second that
c(1/m) log(m2/c) < 1/3
for m sufficiently large.
Together with (9), we now get
K(y | b) ≥
2n
3m
−K(x) (10)
if m is chosen sufficiently large. On the other hand,
K(y | ab) ≤ K(x | ab) + h(Θ(1/m2))n (11)
≤ K(x) +
n
3m
. (12)
Now, (3), (10), and (12) together imply
K(x) ≤
n
6m
= Θ(n) ;
in particular, x must be uncomputable. This concludes the proof. ✷
3.4 Kolmogorov Amplification and the All-or-Nothing Nature of
the Church-Turing Hypothesis
The shown result implies that if the experimenters are given access to an in-
compressible number (such as Ω [11]) for choosing their measurement bases,
then the measured photon (in a least one of the two labs) is forced to generate
an uncomputable number as well, even given the string determining its basis
choices.
This is a similar observation as in the probabilistic realm, where certain “free-
will theorems” have been formulated in the context. In fact, stronger statements
hold there, since non-local correlations allow for randomness amplification as
well as expansion (see, e.g., [15]): The randomness generated by the photons
as their measurement output qualitatively and quantitatively exceeds what is
required for the choices of the measurement settings. This also holds in our
complexity-based model: Indeed, it has been shown in [4] that functionalities
such as Kolmogorov-complexity amplification and expansion are possible using
Bell correlations. The consequence is that there is either no incompressibility or
uncomputability at all in the world, or it is full of it.
All-or-Nothing Feature of the Church-Turing Hypothesis. Either no
device exists in nature allowing for producing uncomputable sequences, or even
a single photon can do it.
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4 Concluding Remarks and Open Questions
The antagonism between the pre-Socratic philosophers Parmenides and Hera-
clitus is still vivid in today’s thinking traditions: The Parmenidean line puts
logic is the basis of space-time and dynamics — in the end all of physics. It has
inspired researchers such as Leibniz, Mach, or Wheeler. Central here is a doubt
about a priori absolute space-time causality: Is it possible that these concepts
only emerge at a higher level of complexity, along with macroscopic, classical
information?
Fundamentally opposed is the Heraclitean style, seeing physics and its objects
at the center: space, time, causality, and dynamic change is what all rests upon,
including logic, computation, or information. To this tradition belong Newton,
most physicists including Einstein, the logician Gonseth, certainly Landauer.
According to Paul Feyerabend [19], a specific tradition comes with its own
criteria for success etc., and it can be judged from the standpoint of another (with
those other criteria). In this spirit, it has been the goal of our discourse to build
bridges between styles, and to use their tension to serve us. This allowed, for
instance, to get more insight into the second law of thermodynamics or the “non-
local” correlations from quantum theory. The latter challenge our established
views of space and time; they, actually, have us look back to the debate between
Newton and Leibniz and to question the path most of science decided to take,
at that time.
For the sake of a final thought, assume a` la Leibniz that space, time, and
causality do not exist prior to classical information — which we understand as
an idealized notion of macroscopically and highly redundantly represented infor-
mation; an ideal classical bit can then be measured without disturbance, copied,
and easily recognized as being classical. In this view, classicality is a thermody-
namic notion. Thus the key to the quantum measurement process, and the prob-
lems linked to it, may lie within thermodynamics. (Yet, even if this is successful:
How come we observe correlations of pieces of classical information unexplain-
able by any reasonable classical mechanism? How can quantum correlations and
thermodynamic classicality — Bell & Boltzmann — be reconciled?)
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